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Abstract
Little is known about the links between the business sector and civil society in Norway. To address the lack of knowledge,
this study focused on members of the business elite who are elected representatives in voluntary organizations. Informa-
tion about these representatives was obtained from a national survey of Norwegian elites and used to examine to what
extent voluntary organizations are integrated into the business community’s network of institutions and organizations
outside the corporate world. The analyses demonstrate that voluntary organizations are well placed within this network.
Moreover, business leaders who are elected representatives are well-connected. Several of them serve on state boards
and have frequent contact with politicians and state administrators. Business leaders who have experienced pronounced
social mobility seem to be more attracted to being involved in the governance of voluntary organizations than their col-
leagues with a more privileged background.
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1. Introduction
In Norway, as in the other Scandinavian countries,
Denmark and Sweden, the links between the state and
voluntary organizations are many and dense (Enjolras &
Strømsnes, 2018; Selle, 1993). Organizations turn to the
state for cooperation, funding and legitimacy. The bonds
between voluntary organizations and the business sec-
tor have, however, traditionally been weaker. One rea-
son for this situation is that, historically, philanthropy
has not been held in high regard in Norwegian society.
Although the business sector has been involved in vol-
untary organizations through philanthropy and charity in
Great Britain and the US, charity has been considered
somewhat patronizing and something to be avoided in
Norway (Sivesind, 2015). Nonetheless, the Norwegian
business community is connected to voluntary organiza-
tions in various ways. Corporations contribute financially,
and some business leaders hold positions in these orga-
nizations’ governing bodies. There is, however, little sys-
tematic knowledge about the connections between the
two sectors. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to
learn more about the relationship between the business
community and civil society.
In previous international research, the relationships
between voluntary organizations and the business sec-
tor have been studied in various ways. Scholars have ex-
amined how business-like practices have been incorpo-
rated into civil society organizations (CSOs), which has
led to the hybridization of these organizations (Billis,
2010; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Moore, Sobieraj, White,
Mayorova, & Beaulieu, 2002; Suykens, De Rynck, &
Verschuere, 2020). Others have described how the gov-
erning bodies of CSOs function as meeting places where
members of the economic elite and the upper class so-
cialize and bolster their status (Domhoff, 1967; Ostrower,
1998; Salzman & Domhoff, 1983). Several researchers
have focused on the network linkages between busi-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 130–141 130
ness corporations and CSOs (MacLean, Harvey, & Kling,
2014; MacLean, Harvey, & Kling, 2017; Moore et al.,
2002; Moore & White, 2000; Salzman & Domhoff, 1983;
Vidovich & Currie, 2012). They have used network tech-
niques to survey, for example, interlocking directorships
between business corporations and charities and volun-
tary organizations. In some projects, public bodies and
industry associations are also included. Moreover, sev-
eral scholars have discussed why voluntary organizations
invite business leaders to participate in their govern-
ing bodies and have studied the motivations of leaders
who accept these invitations (e.g., Abzug & Galaskiewicz,
2001; Middleton, 1987; Moore &White, 2000; Ostrower,
1998; Ostrower & Stone, 2006).
In this article, close attention is given to examin-
ing linkages between the business sector and civil so-
ciety. This will be achieved by charting members of
the Norwegian business elite who participate in what
MacLean et al. (2017) call “extra-corporate networking.”
MacLean et al.’s (2017) definition of extra-corporate po-
sitions includes board positions in institutions and orga-
nizations outside of individual corporations. This cate-
gory encompasses positions held not only in voluntary
organizations but also in business associations and state
boards and committees. This information will be used
to investigate to what extent voluntary organizations
are integrated into the overall external network of the
Norwegian business elite. In their study of the interlock-
ing network between businesses, non-profits and fed-
eral advisory committees, Moore et al. (2002) found that
non-profit organizations were relative outsiders in the in-
terlocking network. These findings prompted two ques-
tions: Does the same pattern exist in Norway? And are
voluntary organizations sparsely represented in the busi-
ness elite’s overall extra-corporate network?
Business leaders who are elected representatives in
voluntary organizations can be viewed as “bridging ac-
tors” (Burt, 1992; MacLean et al., 2017) or “boundary
spanners” (Lewis, 2010) between the business commu-
nity and civil society. Boundary spanners can perform
tasks that benefit the sectors, organizations or groups
they are spanning (Lewis, 2010). They can transmit im-
portant knowledge from one sector to the other, and
they can stimulate learning and innovation across sec-
tors. Bridging actors are in a position to form coalitions
that can determine institutional settlements and control
societal resource flows (MacLean et al., 2017). Bridging
actors also build social and organizational capital that
can favour their personal careers (MacLean et al., 2017).
Accordingly, it would be interesting to learn more about
people who occupy boundary spanning and bridging
roles. This article, therefore, will also describe in greater
detail peoplewho are or have served as elected represen-
tatives in national voluntary organizations and address
the following questions: What characteristics do they
have? And do they distinguish themselves from business
elite individuals having other forms of extra-corporate
bonds/linkages?
To answer the four aforementioned questions, data
from the 2015 Leadership Study, a national elite sur-
vey, conducted in collaboration between the Institute
for Social Research and Statistics Norway will be used
(Gulbrandsen, 2019; Torsteinsen, 2017). The analyses
presented in this article are primarily descriptive and ex-
ploratory in nature. The intention is to provide plausi-
ble interpretations of the findings rather than test spe-
cific theories.
2. Definitions
In general, the term “elite” is defined as a select group
of people who have superior abilities or qualities when
compared to other members of a group or society. In
sociology, the term is employed to describe powerful
and influential individuals and groups and to analyse
the power structure in a specific country. In previous re-
search, several definitions or meanings of the term have
been suggested (Gulbrandsen, 2019). In contemporary
research, there are two prevailing definitions: Elites are
defined as either (1) individuals who hold command po-
sitions in significant institutions and organizations (Mills,
1956) or (2) groups and individuals who control dispro-
portionately large amounts of vital resources, particu-
larly money (Bourdieu, 1986; Kahn, 2012). In the 2015
Leadership Study, we followed Mills (1956) and defined
elites as holders of top leadership positions in significant
institutions and organizations.
In the 2015 Leadership Study, the term “business
elite” was defined as people who hold leadership posi-
tions at the apex of the largest corporations in the econ-
omy. We focused on two types of positions: CEOs and
chairmen of the boards of the corporations. According to
Kahn (2012) and Bourdieu (1986), wealthy or super-rich
individuals should also be included in the “business elite”
category. However, unless wealthy persons also held po-
sitions as CEOor chairmanof the board in a large corpora-
tion, super-rich people were not considered to be mem-
bers of the business elite in the 2015 Leadership Study.
3. The Norwegian Case: Capitalism with Strong State
Involvement
Similar to how voluntary organizations are integrated
with the state, business corporations also havemany ties
to the state. Firstly, a unique feature of the Norwegian
economy is that the state has traditionally been an ac-
tive participant in the economy and remains a large busi-
ness owner. Currently, the state owns about 30 percent
of the stock listed on the Oslo stock exchange. Secondly,
the business community is highly dependent on the state
for delivering various services and outcomes, such as
a stable macroeconomic environment, effective infras-
tructure, a well-functioning educational and legal sys-
tem and necessary market regulations. Moreover, the
ongoing restructuring and innovations in the economy
would not be possible without close collaboration be-
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tween business companies and scientists and technol-
ogists at state-financed universities and research insti-
tutes. Thirdly, the state is heavily involved in containing
and regulating conflicts of interest between capital and
labour. The state has initiated extensive labour legisla-
tion. Moreover, the state has participated actively in tri-
partite agreements and cooperation between organiza-
tions representing capital and labour. The many ties be-
tween the business sector, other sectors, such as civil so-
ciety, and the state have generated a national elite net-
work. This network provides favourable structural condi-
tions and meeting places for interaction between mem-
bers of various elite groups in Norwegian society.
4. Description of the Norwegian Civil Society
The civil society in Norway, as well as in Denmark and
Sweden, constitutes a distinct Scandinavian model, dif-
ferent from civil society regimes found in other countries
(Enjolras & Strømsnes, 2018). The civil society in Norway
is characterized by a high level of citizen participation in
voluntary organizations, measured in terms of member-
ships and volunteers (Sivesind, Arnesen, Gulbrandsen,
Nordø, & Enjolras, 2018). Individuals in what the authors
describe as elite occupations are overrepresented as vol-
unteers (Eimhjellen & Fladmoe, 2020). Secondly, these
organizations have traditionally been hierarchically orga-
nized, with local, regional, and national chapters. The
model for this organizational structure was originally
the political party and the broad popular movements
that historically played a pivotal role in these countries
(Wollebæk & Selle, 2002). Thirdly, as mentioned above,
the relationship between the state and civil society is
characterized by close collaboration and integration.
However, significant changes took place in the
Norwegian civil society during the second half of the
20th century. The composition of CSOs has changed. As a
result of the emergence of the “leisure society” dur-
ing the second half of the 20th century, the organiza-
tional society has become more dominated by organiza-
tions within the cultural and leisure fields, while the wel-
fare field has become comparably smaller (Wollebæk &
Selle, 2002).
At the organizational level, new organizations are of-
ten formed around more narrow issues than the tra-
ditional broad society-oriented organizations. However,
the number of organizations at the local level is decreas-
ing, but it is increasing at the national level. Currently,
there are close to 4,000 national voluntary organizations
(Arnesen & Sivesind, 2020). National organizations are
increasingly more likely to not have local chapters, and
local organizations are, to a lesser extent, connected to
national organizations. A dual organizational structure is
developing, where different organizations exist at the lo-
cal and national levels (Sivesind et al., 2018).
In Norway, voluntary organizations and non-profits
are regulated under the law of associations (Woxholth,
1998). The governing bodies of a normal democratic as-
sociation in Norway are the general assembly, execu-
tive committee and auditors. The general assembly is
the supreme body of the association and consists of the
members. In national associations with local chapters,
the members are representatives elected by local chap-
ters. The general assembly elects representatives to the
executive committee. It is responsible for the day-to-day
management of the association. In large, national, volun-
tary organizations, this responsibility is usually delegated
to a hired manager. Business leaders can be elected to
the executive committee, to the general assembly from
a local chapter or to the audit committee.
5. Theory and Analytic Design
In earlier research on the relationship between the busi-
ness community and voluntary organizations, the con-
nectionswere often analysed in terms of elite integration
(Moore et al., 2002; Ratcliff, Gallagher, & Ratcliff, 1979;
Salzman & Domhoff, 1983). Scholars have discussed how
the bonds and networking arenas between the two sec-
tors contribute to promoting integration between or
within involved elite groups. For instance, Salzman and
Domhoff (1983) claimed that non-profit boards provide
a place where business elites can exchange information
and develop common viewpoints. In their opinion, these
functions are instrumental in promoting class cohesion.
Studies of elite integration raise the question of to
what extent different elite groups or segments within a
specific elite group are united, divided and opposed or
fragmented and not related to each other. For analytic
purposes, it is necessary to distinguish betweenmanifes-
tations of elite integration and structural circumstances
fostering integration (Engelstad, 2018; Gulbrandsen,
2019). Integration is manifested in various ways: (1) as
consensus on significant values or desired properties of
the society, (2) subjective feelings or perceptions of be-
longing to the same community, (3) mutual trust be-
tween different elite groups, (4) perceptions of comple-
mentarity (i.e., that they are mutually dependent upon
each other), and (5) instances of collective action, com-
promises and cooperation.
We can discern between at least two forms of struc-
tural conditions that are favourable for the development
of elite integration. The first condition is social similarity
between elite individuals and groups. Examples of social
similarity are: (1) having grown up in families of the same
social class or status, (2) having attended the same elite
high schools and universities, and (3) having shared ca-
reer experiences. The second condition is social relations
and social arenas that bring elite individuals into contact
with each other. Mills (1956), Domhoff (1967) and Farkas
(2012) focusedon social clubs asmeeting places for build-
ing relationships between elite individuals and for pro-
moting elite unity. According to Higley, Hoffmann-Lange,
Kadushin, and Moore (1991), elite unity is facilitated by
the incorporation of members of different elite groups
into a national elite network where the top leaders meet
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each other, deliberate and forge compromises. Wiesel
(2018) showed how connections bridging diverse elite
circles in elite neighbourhoods could be understood as
a mechanism of elite integration. In this article, the an-
alytic approach is primarily to study the structural con-
ditions for integration between the business community
and voluntary organizations.
As shown above, earlier studies of relationships
between business corporations and voluntary organi-
zations have focused on interlocking directorships be-
tween corporations and these organizations. In stud-
ies of interlocking directorships, researchers have con-
centrated on describing the properties of the network
structure created by interlocks. Moreover, they have of-
ten been particularly interested in identifying the most
central corporations or organizations and persons in
the network.
In contrast, in the current study, the frequency of
members of the business elite holding extra-corporate
positions will be determined. The focus is on the preva-
lence of holding such positions, as well as the structure
of overlapping positions.Moreover, a broader set of posi-
tions and contacts than the ones in the aforementioned
studies will be examined. First, a survey of the extent
to which business leaders have been elected represen-
tatives in national voluntary organizations will be con-
ducted. Positions held in national employer and indus-
try associations, political parties, state committees and
boards, and the extent of contact with politicians and
senior civil servants will also be surveyed. These data
will help determine the overall external network of the
Norwegian business elite and the place voluntary organi-
zations have within this network. Comparing the preva-
lence of the different external network positions will en-
able the consideration of whether voluntary organiza-
tions are centrally located in the external business net-
work or are rather isolated.
The number of positions the elected representatives
have in other sectors will also be surveyed to address the
following questions: How many of them are also mem-
bers of boards of employer and industry organizations
or members of state boards and committees? And how
frequently do they have contact with politicians and se-
nior public servants? This information gives another indi-
cation of the centrality of voluntary organizations in the
business elite extra-corporate network.
Asmentioned above, the business elite elected repre-
sentatives in voluntary organizations are boundary span-
ners between business and civil society. Given the im-
portance of the role of boundary spanner, more should
be known about their distinguishing features. Ostrower
(1998) and Moore et al. (2002) demonstrated that busi-
ness leaders who are members of boards of CSOs are
characterized by upper-class origin, distinguished educa-
tion and family wealth. For these prominent leaders, par-
ticipating in the governance of CSOs fosters feelings of
belonging to the same elite community, as well as nur-
tures a shared outlook and consensus on significant val-
ues. In other words, CSOs constitute a significant mecha-
nism for manifested elite integration.
In their study of access to the “power field” in French
society, MacLean et al. (2017) discovered that the size
of business leaders’ extra-corporate networks was signif-
icantly related to the leaders’ class background. Leaders
who grew up in upper and upper-middle-class families
had more board positions in voluntary organizations
than their colleagues who had moved up from the lower
classes. Elite education also appeared to be a significant
predictor of occupying bridging positions. In line with
these scholars, the business leaders’ social background,
the parents’ and respondents’ education and wealth will
be charted to address the following question: Do the
elected representatives in voluntary organizations stand
out in terms of wealth and an upper-class origin com-
pared to business leaders without such positions?
6. Data and Method
The purpose of the 2015 Leadership Study was to ex-
amine the characteristics of Norwegian elite individuals,
including their social background and careers, relation-
ships to each other, attitudes on a large number of key
policy issues, and lobbying activities. As in earlier na-
tional elite studies (Gulbrandsen et al., 2002; Higley et al.,
1991; Hoffmann-Lange, 1992; Ruostetsaari, 2015), in the
2015 Leadership Study, we aimed to chart the whole
population of elite individuals in the Norwegian society.
The population was established by the so-called position
method, which means that within selected sectors, we
identified the most important formal top leadership po-
sitions. We then selected the persons holding these posi-
tions. The positions and persons holding these positions
were identified in a collaboration between the Institute
for Social Research and Statistics Norway. We included
command positions from ten sectors, including the busi-
ness sector (Gulbrandsen, 2019; Torsteinsen, 2017).
For the purpose of this article, members of the
business elite—CEOs and chairmen of the board of
the largest companies—were selected. The identifica-
tion of members of the business elite was performed
by Statistics Norway. Statistics Norway selected CEOs
and chairmen of the board of all enterprises with more
than 1,000 employees and those of all enterprises with
more than five billion Norwegian kroner in turnover
(and less than 1,000 employees). Sixty-three percent of
the selected CEOs and chairmen of the board chose
to participate in the survey, a total of 242 individuals.
Thirty-one percent of these individuals were chairmen of
the board of an enterprise, and 69 percent were CEOs
or presidents.
The business leaders’ extra-corporate network was
measured by asking them whether, in 2015 or the pre-
ceding five years, they had held any of the following
four positions: (1) member of the board of a national
employer or industry association, (2) elected represen-
tative in a national voluntary or non-profit organization,
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(3) member of one of the governing bodies of a political
party, (4) position in a state board or committee. Then,
the business leaders’ contacts with representatives of
the political system were charted by enquiring how fre-
quently in the previous year they had been in contact
with (1)members of parliament, (2)members of the cabi-
net, and (3) top administrative leaders of ministries, pub-
lic agencies and regulators. The question had four an-
swer choices: (1) “weekly or more often,” (2) “monthly,”
(3) “rarely,” and (4) “never.”
In the 2015 Leadership Study, the construction of
the class variable was based on the father’s occupa-
tion. Operational definitions of the various classes were
derived from a model developed at the Institute for
Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, re-
ferred to as the Oslo register data class scheme (ORDC;
Hansen, Flemmen, & Andersen, 2009). For the pur-
poses of analysis in this article, four classes are used:
upper-class, upper-middle-class, lower-middle-class, and
working-class/primary sector. The respondents’ educa-
tion level, as well as that of their fathers and mothers,
is a variable with five values: (1) primary school, (2) sec-
ondary school, (3) university education at the bache-
lor’s level, (4) university education at the master’s level,
and (5) university education at the doctoral level or sim-
ilar. In the statistical analyses, education is a continu-
ous variable.
The business leaders’ wealth was quantified as the
taxable gross assets of their households. This informa-
tionwas retrieved frompublic registers. Thismeasure is a
standard measure used in public statistics in many coun-
tries. In the statistical analyses, the logarithmic form of
this variable is used. Measuring household wealth is par-
ticularly useful when studying elites since their lifestyle
and welfare are influenced by both spouses’ contribu-
tions to the family economy.
Age and gender are included as control variables. The
older the business leaders are, the more years they have
been visible as members of the elite. Visibility proba-
bly increases the number of invitations to join a volun-
tary organization as an elected representative. Ostrower
and Stone (2006) have shown that women are increas-
ingly involved in the governing of CSOs. It is possible that
women’s values make them more motivated to join the
boards of CSOs; however, only 13 percent of the business
leaders were women.
7. Descriptive Statistics
The CEOs and chairmen of the boards of the largest en-
terprises in Norway have busywork schedules. Table 1 re-
veals that many of them nevertheless emphasize partici-
pating in extra-corporate networks. Fifty percent of them
were or had been members of the board of an employer
or industry association. Fifteen percent (36 individuals)
had been elected representatives in a national voluntary
organization. Only 2 percent had participated in the gov-
ernance of a political party, while 15 percent had been
members of state boards or committees. Nineteen per-
cent had at least monthly contact with members of par-
liament, while 12 percent had contact with members of
the cabinet, and 24 percent had monthly contact with
the administrative leaders of ministries and directorates.
Nineteen percent of the CEOs and chairmen of the
board of the largest corporations in Norway were from
upper-class families, while 46 percent were from the
upper-middle-class, and 10 percent were from the lower-
middle-class. Twenty-five percent of the CEOs and chair-
men of the board of the largest companies in Norway
grew up in working-class families, indicating that there
has been a significant degree of upward mobility into
business-elite positions.
The business elite in this study are well educated.
Only 6 percent of them have a secondary school educa-
tion or less, while 16 percent have a bachelor’s degree,
67 percent have a master’s degree, and 10 percent have
a PhD. As expected, the business leaders’ fathers did not
have the same level of education, on average, as their
sons (and a few daughters). Even so, they were proba-
bly better educated than males in the same generation.
Fifty-three percent of the fathers have a bachelor’s or
master’s degree. Typically, the educational level of the
fathers varied with their occupational status. As much as
48 percent of the fathers who, by occupation, belong to
theworking-class only have a primary school level of edu-
cation. Only 4 percent of fathers belonging to the upper-
class have this level of education. As much as 63 percent
of the upper-class fathers have amaster’s or PhD degree,
compared to 2 percent of the working-class fathers.
Thirty percent of the business leaders’ mothers have
completed only primary school, while 36 percent com-
pleted secondary school, 26 percent have a bache-
lor’s degree, and 8 percent have a master’s degree or
higher. There is a strong correlation between the fathers’
and mothers’ educational levels (Pearson’s r = 0.51).
However, there is some variation in the fathers’ occupa-
tional status. Fifty-nine percent of the mothers whose
husbands belong to the upper-class by virtue of their oc-
cupation have only a primary or secondary school level of
education, and 48 percent of mothers whose husbands
have lower-middle-class occupations have a bachelor’s
or master’s degree.
Average taxable gross assets among the members
of the business elite were 90 million Norwegian kroner,
close to ten million Euros. However, the business elite
exhibited an unequal distribution of assets (SD = 795
million Norwegian kroner). Six of the business lead-
ers had more than 600 million kroner. Three of these
were billionaires.
8. Results
Table 1 demonstrates that the business elites’ extra-
corporate network primarily includes positions on the
boards of national employer and business associations,
which is unsurprising. The boards of these associa-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 130–141 134
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Wealth 90 million kroner (average)
Age 54 (average)
Member of the board of employer and industry associations (percent) 50
Elected representative in a voluntary organization on the national level (percent) 15
Member of the governing body of a political party on the national level (percent) 2
Member of state boards and committees (percent) 15
Monthly or more frequent contact with members of parliament 19
Monthly or more frequent contact with members of the cabinet 12
Monthly or more frequent contact with administrative heads of ministries and directorates 24
Class origin based on father’s occupation (percent)
Upper-class 19
Upper-middle-class 46
Lower-middle-class 10
Working-class 25
Business leader’s educational level (percent)
Primary school
Secondary school 6
University education at the bachelor’s level 16
University education at the master’s level or higher 77
Father’s educational level (percent)
Primary education 15
Secondary education 32
University education at the bachelor’s level 24
University education at the master’s level 29
Mother’s educational level (percent)
Primary school 30
Secondary school 36
University education at the bachelor’s level 26
University education at the master’s level 8
Gender (percent)
Men 87
Women 13
N 242
tions are salient as arenas where the business commu-
nity’s policies are discussed and determined. In contrast,
Table 1 also shows that business leaders are not much in-
terested in being members of the governing bodies of a
political party; they seem to stay clear of party politics.
Outside the realm of corporations and employer and
business associations, however, the number of connec-
tions that elite individuals have to voluntary organiza-
tions is on par with their connections to the political sys-
tem. While (as mentioned above) 15 percent of the busi-
ness leaders had been elected representatives in volun-
tary organizations, the same percentage had been mem-
bers of state boards and committees. Only a slightly
higher percentage of the business leaders have had
monthly contact with members of parliament and senior
civil servants.
Table 2 presents the correlations between the vari-
ables representing various extra-corporate positions.
The variable “positions in a political party” is not included
since so few of the business leaders had held such po-
sitions. Moreover, correlations between the three vari-
ables measuring the frequency of contact with represen-
tatives of the political system are also excluded.
The correlational analysis presented in Table 2 indi-
cates combinations of positions that are (significantly)
prevalent among the business leaders. In terms of the
number of individuals, the members of boards of em-
ployer and industry associations have the most links to
institutions and organizations outside the business com-
munity. Their wide network of connections is a result of
their functions in business associations. They contribute
to shaping the stance of the business community in var-
ious policy issues, and they are expected to actively rep-
resent business interests, vis-à-vis politicians and senior
civil servants.
Table 2 demonstrates, however, that elected rep-
resentatives in voluntary organizations are significantly
more active in the extra-corporate network than busi-
ness leaders unconnected to voluntary organizations.
They are more often members of state boards and com-
mittees. They also have significantly more frequent con-
tact with representatives of parliament and administra-
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Table 2. Combinations of extra-corporate positions.
Member of the boards of
Elected representative in employer or industry Member of state boards
voluntary organizations associations and committees
Elected representatives 1.00
in voluntary organizations
Member of boards of 0.08 (22) 1.00
employer and industry
associations
Member of state boards 0.21*** (12) 0.12* (23) 1.00
and committees
Frequency of contact with 0.12* (12) 0.13** (32) 0.27*** (17)
members of parliament
Frequency of contact with 0.08 (7) 0.11* (20) 0.26*** (12)
members of the cabinet
Frequency of contact with 0.12* (16) 0.19** (44) 0.20*** (18)
administrative heads of
ministries and directorates
Notes: Pearson’s r results are depicted; the number of individuals having each of the combinations is in parentheses; levels of significance
are ***1 percent, **5 percent and *10 percent.
tive heads of ministries and directorates. Accordingly,
these business leaders are bridges between the busi-
ness world, voluntary organizations, and the political-
bureaucratic system. They are, however, neither more
nor less represented in the boards of employer and busi-
ness associations.
As mentioned above, in earlier studies of the
boundary-spanning network ofmembers of the elite, the
focus has been upon identifying the most central per-
sons in the network (MacLean et al., 2014, 2017; Moore
et al., 2002; Moore & White, 2000; Salzman & Domhoff,
1983; Useem, 1984; Vidovich & Currie, 2012). Useem
(1984) labelled these persons as members of “the inner
circle.” MacLean et al. (2014, 2017) have similarly de-
scribed such elite individuals as “hyper-agents” or as the
“elite of the elite.” As measures of centrality, the scholars
have counted the number of overlapping board positions
or the number of positions in extra-corporate organiza-
tions and institutions (MacLean et al., 2017).
The number of extra-corporate positions held by
members of the Norwegian business elite was also
counted. In this count, positions in (1) employer and busi-
ness associations, (2) voluntary organizations, (3) politi-
cal parties, and (4) state boards and committees are in-
cluded. This simple operation showed that holding sev-
eral positions is uncommon. Forty percent of the busi-
ness leaders had held only one position, while 43 percent
had held two positions, 14 percent had held three posi-
tions, and 2 percent had held four positions. Moreover,
in a separate multivariate analysis not presented here, it
appeared that, contrary to what MacLean et al. (2017)
found, holding several extra-corporate positions is unre-
lated to the business leaders’ class background.
More importantly, the number of such positions
varies between different groupswithin the business com-
munity. Elected representatives in voluntary organiza-
tions have held, on average, 2.8 positions. Business lead-
ers who are not involved in such organizations have held
only 1.6 extra-corporate positions. Business leaders who
are members of the boards of employer and industry as-
sociations (excluding the elected representatives in vol-
untary organizations) have held 2.1 positions on average.
Next, the characteristics of business leaders who
have been elected representatives in voluntary organiza-
tions were analysed more closely. As shown above, they
function as bridges not only between the business com-
munity and voluntary organizations but also, to some
extent, between these institutions and the political sys-
tem. This finding prompted a further examination of
these individuals. A statistical analysis of all themembers
of the business elite was then performed to determine
the extent to which being an elected representative in
voluntary organizations is statistically related to various
personal characteristics (cf. Model 1 in Table 3). In the
model, the business leaders’ education and class back-
ground, wealth, age, gender and mothers’ educational
level were included. Logistic regression was used in the
analysis, and being elected representative or not was a
dependent variable. The fathers’ education was not in-
cluded since this variable correlates strongly with both
the fathers’ occupational status and the mothers’ educa-
tional level.
Model 2 in Table 3 shows the results of a similar sta-
tistical analysis where the dependent variable is whether
the business leaders are or have been members of the
boards of employer and industry associations. Leaders
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Table 3. Personal characteristics of elected representatives in voluntary organizations and members of the boards of em-
ployer and industry associations.
Model 1. Elected representatives Model 2. Members of boards of
in voluntary organizations employer and industry associations
Parameter Estimates Estimates
Intercept −8.271*** (.2.631) −5.741*** (2.157)
Class origin (compared with working-class)
Upper-class −1.567** (0.681) 0.212 (0.476)
Upper-middle-class −0.999** (0.483) −0.053 (0.398)
Lower-middle-class −1.076 (0.744) −0.169 (0.576)
Log wealth 0.286** (0.128) 0.229* (0.122)
Leaders’ education −0.085 (0.287) 0.492** (0.228)
Mothers’ education 0.691*** (0.233) 0.231 (0.180)
Age 0.027 (0.027) 0.004 (0.021)
Gender. Male = 1 0.034 (0.593) −0.686 (0.467)
−2 Log L 183.770 263.499
N 237 201
Notes: Logistic regression; standard errors in parentheses; levels of significance are ***1 percent, **5 percent and *10 percent.
who also were elected representatives in voluntary or-
ganizations were not included in this analysis. (Including
these persons does not, however, alter the results of
the analysis).
Notably, in Table 3, the two groups of business lead-
ers are socially different, particularly as it relates to so-
cial origin. Model 2 in Table 3 demonstrates that being a
board member in employer and industry associations is
unrelated to the occupational status of the business lead-
ers’ fathers. Business leaders from upper-class families
are neither more nor less inclined to join the governing
bodies of associations in which individual corporations
aremembers. In contrast, Model 1 in Table 3 reveals that
leaders who have been elected representatives in volun-
tary organizations are significantly more likely to have
been raised in working-class families.
Additionally, membership on the boards of employer
and industry association is related to the educational
level of the elite individuals. It seems that the best-
educated leaders are chosen to represent the business
interests of these associations. A surprising difference is
that holding positions in voluntary organizations is signif-
icantly associated with the educational level of the busi-
ness leaders’ mothers. The higher the level of education
the mothers have, the more likely that the leaders were
or had been elected to the governing body in a volun-
tary organization. However, the two groups of business
leaders have one characteristic in common: Table 3 re-
veals that wealthy business leaders, independent of their
class background, have a higher probability of being rep-
resented in each of the two groups.
9. Discussion
In international research, there are different opinions
about the network relationships between the business
sector and civil society. In a survey of the network in-
volving a selection of large corporations, charities, foun-
dations, and state advisory boards, Moore et al. (2002)
found that voluntary organizations were relatively iso-
lated within the network. In a study of the French elite,
MacLean et al. (2017) discovered that centrality in an
extra-corporate network was a significant factor behind
access to the “elite of the elite.”
In contrast to what Moore et al. (2002) found in
the US, voluntary organizations in Norway do not have
a peripheral position within the business network with
the outside world. Instead, the connections of the busi-
ness elite to voluntary organizations are as common as
links to various parts of the political-bureaucratic sys-
tem.Moreover, as demonstrated above, the participants
in the governance of voluntary organizations are among
the most well-connected members of the business elite.
Accordingly, they act as bridging actors between the busi-
ness community, civil society and public sector and can,
as such, facilitate elite integration across sectors.
There are probably various reasons why business
leaders are invited to join the governing bodies of volun-
tary organizations. Similarly, the business leaders likely
have had variousmotives for accepting the invitations. In
the Norwegian context, well-connected business leaders
are probably valuable to many national voluntary organi-
zations. Norway is characterized by a large welfare state
that is an important source of funding for many of these
organizations. Many of them actively lobby politicians
and senior civil servants (Sivesind et al., 2018). Business
leaders with knowledge of the bureaucratic-political sys-
tem arewell equipped to give useful advice about how to
manoeuvre in this complex environment to obtain fund-
ing and influence political decisions.
Another indication of the integration of voluntary or-
ganizations into the business elite network is the posi-
tion of wealthy business leaders. These super-rich elite
individuals (some of them are billionaires) are over-
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represented among participants in the governance of
both voluntary organizations and employer and indus-
try associations. Given the definition of business elite fol-
lowed in this article, these super-rich persons are proba-
bly CEOs or chairmen of the board of large corporations
in which they are also large shareholders. They have ac-
quired their positions as dominant owners through inher-
itance or by having built up the corporations themselves
through entrepreneurship. It is well known that many of
these “owner-managers” have considerable power and
influence in the Norwegian economy.
Their attendance at governing bodies of voluntary or-
ganizations is possibly a result of an exchange of favours
between the rich business owner and the voluntary or-
ganizations. The organizations have probably received a
substantial donation, and in return, the donator is invited
to join the organization’s governing body. Previous schol-
arship on board composition in CSOs indicates that this
interpretation is valid. However, regardless of their rea-
sons for having accepted positions in voluntary organiza-
tions, the participation of wealthy business leaders is a
testimony to the integration of voluntary organizations
in the business elite network.
However, business leaders who participate in the
governance of Norwegian voluntary organizations differ
from their colleagues on the boards of employer associ-
ations. As shown in Table 3, elected representatives in
voluntary organizations are notably more likely to have
grown up in working-class families. In other words, busi-
ness leaders who have experienced pronounced social
mobility seem to be more attracted to being involved
in the governance of CSOs than colleagues from a priv-
ileged background. Seemingly, this finding goes against
ideas in previous research that privileged elites seek posi-
tions in CSOs to engage in elite socializing and attain pres-
tige and status (Moore & White, 2000; Ostrower, 1998;
Ratcliff et al., 1979; Salzman & Domhoff, 1983).
In the theory section above (Section 5), social simi-
larity was described as a structural precondition for elite
integration. In some of the literature on elites, social
similarity in the form of a shared upper-class origin is
even portrayed as a manifestation of elite integration
(Domhoff, 1967; Mills, 1956). One might ask whether
their working-class background indicates that some of
the elected representatives are less integrated into the
business elite. However, the data provided by the 2015
Leadership Study do not support an unambiguous an-
swer to this question.
The literature on elites and CSOs suggests that “out-
siders” in the elite community are often eager to ac-
quire positions in such organizations. Middleton (1987)
mentioned that becoming a member of the board of a
CSO is an important means to further one’s career in
the business world. She also discussed board member-
ship as a way to develop new friendships and become
more fully integrated into the community. Similarly,
Ostrower (1998) showed that membership on an arts
board opened opportunities for making social connec-
tions and gaining social entrée.MacLean et al. (2017) em-
phasized that positions in CSOs enable elite individuals
to accumulate social and organizational capital, which is
beneficial for entering into the power field of the “hy-
peragents.” Norwegian business leaders who grew up
in working-class families could be particularly preoccu-
pied with these benefits. In line with the ideas and find-
ings of Middleton (1987), Ostrower (1998) and MacLean
et al. (2017), it is likely that they have perceived that their
careers and standing in the community would both be
helped by accepting invitations to become elected rep-
resentatives in voluntary organizations.
As MacLean, Harvey, and Chia (2012) pointed out,
class-bounded career constraints can be overcome if the
individual becomes conscious of the unspoken claims
and adapts to them strategically. Socially-mobile lead-
ership candidates can identify and embrace behaviours
that express the dominant repertoire of cultural cap-
ital, and they can build a social network and culti-
vate personal relationships that could advance their
careers. Business leaders from a working-class back-
ground participating in the governing bodies of voluntary
organizations—significantly more often than their peers
who do not have such a background—are a testimony to
the importance of such reflexivity.
An alternative interpretation is that socially-mobile
members of the business elite want to give back to so-
ciety. The persons who have moved into peak positions
in the business world from an ordinary social origin have
obtained a privileged life. They are well aware of the con-
trast between their new lifestyle and their lifestyle dur-
ing childhood. If they are conscious of this contrast, they
could feel a genuine desire to share the fruits of their
success. One way to do this is by lending their compe-
tence to voluntary organizations. The wish to give back
can also be paired with a need to legitimize their own
success. Socially-mobile business leaders could, perhaps,
feel that theymust assure themselves and significant oth-
ers that their good fortune is well deserved.
The previous explanations focus on socially-mobile
business leaders and their motivations. It is, however,
likely that an explanation of their overrepresentation in
voluntary organizations might just as well be sought in
the absence of business leaders from the upper-class.
This prompts the question ofwhy leaders from the upper-
class are not more engaged in the governing of voluntary
organizations. Being hesitant to take up positions in vol-
untary organizations could be rooted in a preference for
avoiding public attention. Norway is characterized by rel-
atively small income differences and an egalitarian cul-
ture (Aalberg, 1998; Myhre, 2017). Sometimes, this egal-
itarian culture stimulates a negative public focus on priv-
ileged families. Traditional upper-class families may feel
that this public focus questions the legitimacy of their po-
sition in society. Some may counter the threat to their
legitimacy by becoming large donators or participating
in other types of prosocial activities. Others may prefer
to keep their heads low. As the French scholar Daloz
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(2007) observed some years ago, Norwegian elites are
characterized by considerable “conspicuous modesty.”
They prefer to downplay their power and status. Their in-
clination to avoid public attention could motivate them
to abstain from accepting invitations to join the govern-
ing bodies of voluntary organizations.
Surprisingly, the analyses presented above revealed
that joining the governing bodies of voluntary organiza-
tions is significantly related to the educational level of
the business leaders’ mothers. This result might reflect
that in many families, highly educated mothers are stew-
ards of social and occupational ambitions. As Harding,
Morris, and Hughes (2015) noted, they teach their chil-
dren how to behave in both school and work life, as well
as how to relate to authority figures so that it favours
their careers. These mothers may also stimulate their
sons’ and daughters’ ambitions. The mothers’ teach-
ing and encouragement could have made the business
leaders aware of the possible career advantages of par-
ticipating in the governance of voluntary organization
as elected representatives. This interpretation also sug-
gests that voluntary organizations can be useful path-
ways to elite career and prestige. The various explana-
tions discussed in the preceding paragraphs are attempts
at plausible interpretations of the findings presented
above. Further research focusing on business leaders’
motives for becoming elected representatives in volun-
tary organizations is needed to establish the validity of
these interpretations.
10. Conclusion
Previous studies have demonstrated that voluntary orga-
nizations in Norway have many links to the public sector.
The analyses presented in this article indicate they are
also integrated into the extra-corporate network of the
business elite through business leaders who are elected
representatives in these organizations. Admittedly, the
elected representatives constitute a minority of all mem-
bers of the Norwegian business elite. However, they are
well-connected. Several of them act as bridges between
the business world, civil society and the state.
The relationship between the business community
and voluntary organizations reflects the basic features of
the Norwegian welfare-state model. This model is char-
acterized by comprehensive responsibility for the well-
being of citizens, a large public sector and generous wel-
fare benefits, and is distinguished by a unique collabo-
ration between strong trade unions, centralized employ-
ers’ associations and the state. A civil society with a high
level of citizen participation is also an important element
of this model. The Norwegian welfare-state model has
given rise to a close-knit national elite network gravitat-
ing around the state at the centre. The business elite and
the top leaders of national voluntary organizations are
both firmly interwoven in this national network.
Individual business leaders have different motives
for becoming elected representatives in voluntary or-
ganizations. From an overall perspective, their partici-
pation supports the business elite in their endeavours
to promote the interests of the business community.
The elected representatives can help build the legiti-
macy of the business community and form useful po-
litical alliances. Among the elite individuals who partici-
pate in the governance of voluntary organizations, there
is an overrepresentation of leaders who grew up in the
working-class. In this sense, being an elected represen-
tative in these organizations seems to be nearly a “pre-
rogative” for socially-mobile business leaders. This pat-
tern of recruitment could be due to conscious determina-
tion on the part of these leaders to use trusted positions
as a pathway to elite status and prestige. Alternatively,
it could be the result of a genuine desire to give some-
thing back to society and use their talents for the com-
mon good.
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